DFIM — Deterministic Firmware Integrity Matrix

IEC 62443 firmware integrity enforcement suite

View the Project on GitHub Ahmadsi70/DFIM

DFIM Compliance Mapping

Document ID: DFIM-COMP-2026-V1.0
Purpose: Map DFIM technical and process controls to ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A themes and common telecommunications procurement clauses. This is an implementation mapping, not a certification statement.

Scope boundary

In scope Out of scope
Integrity of enrolled firmware/executables Endpoint malware detection (complementary; see PRODUCT_SECURITY_WHITE_PAPER.md §2)
Signed metadata, audit JSONL, attestation Full SOC/SIEM platform
Supply-chain attestations and SBOM Customer GRC program ownership

ISO/IEC 27001:2022 — selected Annex A mapping

Control theme Annex A (2022) DFIM evidence Residual owner action
Configuration management 8.9 phase0-policy.json, ENFORCEMENT_POLICY.md, signed DFIMBOOT v2 Change board for release counters
Information deletion / retention 8.10 TELEMETRY.md retention guidance, redacted JSONL Legal retention schedule
Data masking 8.11 Pseudonymous asset_id, no raw paths in JSONL Access control on audit files
Monitoring activities 8.16 JSONL + OTel Collector, Grafana ops stack SOC alert routing
Clock synchronization 8.17 UTC timestamps in audit; TPM clockInfo.safe gate NTP on hosts
Use of privileged utilities 8.18 Root required for eBPF/IMA attach only Privileged access management
Software installation 8.19 Attested release bundles, CROSS_PLATFORM_RELEASE.md Approved artifact registry
Network security 8.20 OTLP TLS/auth is operator responsibility Network team
Security of network services 8.21 N/A — DFIM is host integrity, not network service —
Segregation in networks 8.22 Protected-scope limits blast radius to enrolled assets Architecture review
Web filtering 8.23 N/A —
Cryptography 8.24 P-256 DFIMBOOT v2, SHA-256 Merkle, TPM quotes HSM/KMS for production keys
Secure development lifecycle 8.25 CI phases 0–12, fuzz/CodeQL/Kani, contracts Pen-test closure
Application security 8.26 Parser bounds, fail-closed CLI, AT tests External pen-test
Secure system architecture 8.27 Layered UEFI/host/eBPF model in THREAT_MODEL.md Deployment review
Secure coding 8.28 Rust #![deny(unsafe_code)] in core, clippy -D warnings —
Security testing 8.29 Fuzz, Kani, adversarial acceptance AT-01..09 Platform qualification
Change management 8.32 Monotonic release counters, rollback baselines CAB approval
Test information 8.33 Synthetic fixtures only in CI; no prod data in repo Test data policy
Protection against malware 8.7 Partial — integrity enforcement, not AV AV remains separate control
Backup 8.13 Recovery artifacts + RECOVERY.md Offline recovery media custody
Redundancy 8.14 Stateless verify; sidecar replay from CMDB HA architecture
Logging 8.15 DFIM_TELEMETRY_OUT, SIEM mapping in ENTERPRISE_INTEGRATION.md Log shipping SLA

Telecommunications procurement clauses (typical)

Clause topic DFIM response Reference
Sub-100 ms validation SLA (controlled host) Host verify path benchmarked; exclusions documented ENTERPRISE_INTEGRATION.md §2
Billing/core node integrity Protected-scope enrollment for fixed executables ENFORCEMENT_POLICY.md
Lawful intercept / metadata minimization Redacted audit schema TELEMETRY.md
Supply-chain integrity CycloneDX SBOM + GitHub attestations SUPPLY_CHAIN.md, CROSS_PLATFORM_RELEASE.md
Disaster recovery recover-v2 + capsule runbook RECOVERY.md, UEFI_CAPSULE_RECOVERY.md
Remote attestation TPM quote protocol REMOTE_ATTESTATION.md, AT-07 evidence
24×7 support See ENTERPRISE_SLA.md Commercial schedule
Penetration test Scope in PEN_TEST_SCOPE.md Third-party report

Phase 0 control cross-reference

ID Compliance relevance
P0-C1 ISO 8.24, 8.26 — live content enforcement
P0-C2 Telecom blast-radius — scoped denial
P0-C3 ISO 8.9 — fail-closed policy
P0-C4..C8 See phase0-policy.json and linked security docs

Auditor checklist

  1. Confirm deployment profile is protected-scope (not global allowlist).
  2. Verify production builds use --features production and HSM-backed signing.
  3. Collect Phase 0–12 contract PASS logs from CI for the release commit.
  4. Collect platform qualification artifacts (AT-01..04, AT-07, AT-08) for the target kernel.
  5. Review pen-test report against PEN_TEST_SCOPE.md with zero open Critical/High.